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Summary 
A careful analysis of the available sources on Heisenberg’s work and further activities during 
World War II and during his internment at Farm Hall after the end of the war leads to the 
following summary: “Heisenberg, like several other German physicists, was drafted by 
German Army Ordnance when war began in Europe in September 1939 to investigate 
whether the energy from splitting Uranium nuclei by neutrons could be used for military 
purposes. Heisenberg found that this is possible in principle but would require such enormous 
industrial expenditures that it would take many years and would be impracticable while the 
war lasted. The project was therefore dropped by the Nazi Government in 1942. Heisenberg 
had even refrained from calculating a precise value for the critical mass of U 235. He was 
relieved that he was thus spared a moral decision between obeying an order to build the 
bomb or risking his life by refusing to be involved in the project or sabotaging it. He was 
happy to be confined to a project of building a small test reactor under civilian 
administration that the Government had approved.. In 1941 Heisenberg had tried to get the 
opinion of Niels Bohr in Copenhagen on what the international community of nuclear 
physicists could possibly do or prevent regarding the long-range technical feasibility of 
making nuclear weapons.  Bohr had misunderstood Heisenberg’s cautious approach.” 
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Introductory Remarks 
In a recent review article of a French novel
1
 in the literary supplement of a 
widely-read German daily newspaper
2
 Heisenberg is called “a pioneer of the 
atom bomb”. This is only another example of the many misunderstandings and 
misrepresentations which often appear in the media on various occasions and 
can even be found in some publications in scientific journals and books. The gist 
of the message in publications of this type is “Heisenberg tried to build an atom 
bomb for Hitler and failed”. 
The expression of such oversimplifying, misinformed and misleading opinions 
began already right after the end of war in Europe in 1945. The construction of 
atom bombs in the “Manhattan Project” had been started under the assumption 
that the Germans under the scientific leadership of Heisenberg were also 
beginning to be engaged in making atom bombs so that the physicists at Los 
Alamos felt, or at least suspected, that they were “in a race with Heisenberg”. 
When it turned out on inspection of the laboratory of Heisenberg’s team at 
Haigerloch by a U.S. advance team on 23 April 1945 that only a small test 
reactor had been constructed that had not reached criticality yet, the Allies were 
led to believe by their own prejudices that this was Heisenberg’s inadequate 
approach to an atom bomb.  
In order to avoid the cementation of prejudices and misconceptions in the 
historical memory of future generations it seems appropriate, as long as some of 
those are still alive who have known Heisenberg and many of his colleagues and 
collaborators personally
3
, to summarize the evidence and straighten out some 
misperceptions that have arisen in some parts of the literature. That is the 
purpose of the present paper. The procedure chosen is to list a few obvious 
questions which arose during and after World War II. The attempt to find 
answers for these questions on the basis of incomplete, false or misinterpreted 
information led to the errors mentioned above. It will be tried to confront them 
with the facts, as far as these are known, and thereby contribute towards a better 
understanding of the difficult situation which one of the greatest physicists of 
the last century had to face under a dictatorial regime in time of war. 
                                           
1
 „Le principe“ by Jérome Ferrari. In this novel Heisenberg’s thinking is described in a poetic way as 
being determined by a “principle of beauty”. The reviewer finds this remarkable for a “pioneer of the 
atom bomb”. 
2
 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 February 2015, page 12 
3
 Klaus Gottstein was a member of the Max Planck Institute for Physics from 1950 to 1970 under the 
directorship of Werner Heisenberg. For several years he was head of the experimental division of the 
Institute. In 1969 he asked Heisenberg about his visit to Bohr in 1941, and Heisenberg told him. 
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Four Questions and Answers 
Question 1: How did Heisenberg get connected with investigations on the 
feasibility of using the energy freed by the splitting of uranium nuclei by 
bombardment with neutrons for driving machines or producing explosive 
weapons? 
Facts and comments: 
The war began on 1 September 1939, and a few weeks later Heisenberg, who 
was professor at the University of Leipzig, and some other German physicists 
were drafted by Army Ordnance to explore the feasibility of a nuclear bomb 
which, after the discovery of fission and of the chain reaction, could not be ruled 
out. How real was this theoretical possibility? Heisenberg was given the task to 
find out. 
Army Ordnance also sequestered the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics in 
Berlin. Its director, Peter Debye, a Dutch citizen, was given the choice to accept 
German citizenship or resign for the duration of the war. He preferred the latter 
and emigrated to the United States. An official of Army Ordnance, the physicist 
Dr. Kurt Diebner, was appointed interim director of the institute. 
 
Question 2: How far did Heisenberg pursue his investigations and what was 
their result? 
Facts and comments: 
By 1941 Heisenberg, after almost two years of intense theoretical and 
experimental investigations by the drafted group known as the “Uranium Club”, 
had reached the conclusion that the construction of a nuclear bomb would be 
feasible in principle, by Uranium isotope separation or by Plutonium  production 
in reactors, but both ways would take many years. They would be beyond the 
means of Germany in time of war, and probably also beyond the means of 
Germany’s adversaries. This opinion was accepted by the leading authorities of 
the Nazi Government. (When Heisenberg heard about the Hiroshima bomb, 
almost four years later while interned at Farm Hall, at first he could not believe 
it was a nuclear bomb.) Munitions and Armaments Minister Speer offered 
support for a small reactor project as a possible source of electric power. Thus, 
the “military project” was abandoned as being useless for Germany’s “final 
victory” in the present war. The sequestration of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for 
Physics was ended, Dr. Diebner returned to his facilities at Army Ordnance 
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where he headed a separate group, and the institute returned to civilian 
administration by the Kaiser Wilhelm Society under the general direction of the 
civilian Reichsforschungsrat (Reich Research Council). Heisenberg was very 
happy with this outcome which spared him the moral decision whether to 
participate in a large bomb project or risk his life by refusing to cooperate in it. 
In July 1942 Heisenberg  was appointed director at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute 
for Physics (not of the Institute because this position remained reserved for Peter 
Debye).  
Thus, Heisenberg’s “failure” had nothing to do with “moral scruples”, sabotage 
or incompetence, as has been suggested by some authors. The project had just 
been terminated because it had shown that “bomb-building” would be extremely 
expensive, lengthy and useless for winning the war. In a personal letter written 
to a friend in October of 1941 Heisenberg called it “imagination run wild” 
(Phantasterei) to think of the use of atomic energy for large-scale destruction 
though he did not exclude that for the distant future.
4
  Nevertheless, 
Heisenberg’s theoretical investigations, carried out by the end of 1939 and the 
beginning of 1940, allowed the possibility of technical use of the energy 
released by splitting uranium nuclei. Experiments done at Leipzig and in other 
German laboratories showed that a “Uranium Machine” with natural Uranium 
and heavy water could function. 
In the course of his work Heisenberg commuted between Leipzig and the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute for Physics in Berlin. In 1942 Heisenberg moved to Berlin for 
preparations for the experimental Uranium reactor.  
 
Question 3: What was the purpose of Heisenberg’s call on Bohr in Copenhagen 
in 1941? 
Facts and comments:  
Although by the second half of 1941 Heisenberg was convinced that in the next 
few years the construction of a nuclear bomb was not feasible, the question 
remained: What about the long-range future? Elisabeth Heisenberg reports in her 
book
5
 that her husband tortured himself with the thought that in the long run the 
                                           
4
 Letter of October 1, 1941 by Werner Heisenberg to Hermann Heimpel, quoted in the brief outline of 
the history of the German Uranium project and of Heisenberg’s activities during the war in the 
Introduction by Helmut Rechenberg to Heisenberg’s „Ordnung der Wirklichkeit“, page 17, i.e. to the 
“Manuscript of 1942”, see Literature at the end of this article 
5
 Elisabeth Heisenberg, Das politische Leben eines Unpolitischen. Erinnerungen an Werner 
Heisenberg, R. Piper & Co Verlag München 1980 
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United States with her superior industrial capacity might be able to produce 
atom bombs and use them on Germany if war conditions dragged on long 
enough. But was the final construction of nuclear weapons unavoidable? Was it 
conceivable that the then small international community of nuclear physicists 
could arrive at an agreement to refrain from the construction of these entirely 
new weapons of mass destruction?  
 
Ever since working with Bohr in Copenhagen in the 1920s Heisenberg had been 
used to discussing with his friend and mentor Bohr difficult questions which 
arose in the course of their work. It was suggesting itself that also in this case it 
would be helpful to discuss the matter with Bohr and get his opinion. What 
Heisenberg, in a kind of naiveté, did not realize was that his old cordial 
relationship with Bohr had been affected by the events of the war. For Bohr his 
old friend Heisenberg was now a representative of an enemy country, of the 
occupying power of his native Denmark, whose remarks would have to be 
looked upon with suspicion. Heisenberg managed to make the trip to 
Copenhagen in September of 1941, using the opportunity of a conference on 
astrophysics arranged by the German Culture Institute in Copenhagen. Bohr 
boycotted this Institute set up by the German Foreign Ministry for propaganda 
purposes after the occupation of Denmark. For Heisenberg accepting an 
invitation to lecture at the Institute was a means to obtain a visa for a visit to 
Copenhagen that would have been unobtainable otherwise. It also provided an 
opportunity to call on his old friend Bohr in an unobtrusive way. 
 
Heisenberg spent several days in Copenhagen and probably saw Bohr several 
times, in Bohr’s office, in Bohr’s home and on a walk. On the latter occasion 
when there was no danger of being overheard by the Gestapo, Heisenberg 
undertook to broach the questions which were the real reasons for his trip. He 
was extremely cautious in choosing his language. Mentioning to Bohr the 
existence of a German nuclear programme and of his participation in it, could be 
interpreted as, and probably was, treason punishable by death. So he used very 
involved expressions which, he assumed, Bohr would understand but which to 
uninitiated Gestapo agents, if they heard of them later by some incautiousness, 
could be explained away as harmless conversation. This is what Heisenberg told 
the present author (K. G.). He regretted after the war that he had not been more 
straightforward, in spite of the risks involved. His intended mission foundered. 
As soon as Bohr understood that Heisenberg was beginning to talk, though 
indirectly, about his assured knowledge that nuclear bombs were feasible in 
principle, Bohr broke off the conversation and would not hear any more about 
this subject. He could not imagine that Heisenberg acted on his own initiative, 
                                                                                                                                    
 
6 
 
without any special permission, let alone orders, by German authorities. But this 
was so. Heisenberg had thought, naively, as mentioned above, that Bohr would 
be ready, as he always had been in earlier times, to discuss with him possible 
solutions for complicated problems. He had lacked the sensitivity for Bohr’s 
patriotic feelings under the changed circumstances of war and occupation. On 
the other hand, it is justified to say that it took great moral courage for 
Heisenberg to talk to Bohr about implications of his secret work. Heisenberg 
risked his neck. 
Bohr, however, had looked with misgivings at the motives of Heisenberg’s visit 
under the conditions of German occupation of Denmark. Bohr was, at the time 
of the visit in 1941, distressed by the circumstances of Heisenberg’s visit, his 
lecture at the German Culture Institute and  his contacts with the German 
Embassy (more correct: Legation) in Copenhagen.
6
 For Bohr it was of central 
and sad significance that Heisenberg during his visit expressed his conviction of 
a final German victory whereas Bohr, as a Danish patriot, had placed all his 
hopes in a German defeat. In September of 1941, with large parts of Europe 
occupied by Germany, German troops approaching Moscow, and the United 
States continuing to remain neutral, Heisenberg concluded that Germany might 
win the war after all. At the beginning of the war he had, in private, expressed 
the view that Hitler would lose the war like a chess-player would lose a game 
into which he entered with one castle less than his opponent. But now 
Heisenberg like most non-Nazi Germans had come to the conclusion that a 
German victory seemed likely. They feared that a German defeat would mean 
Soviet occupation of Europe which, even for anti-Nazis, was considered an even 
greater evil than German domination. Auschwitz and the full extent of Nazi 
crimes were not yet known, but Stalin’s massacres were. The hope - completely 
unrealistic as we now know but considered realistic at the time - was that after a 
German victory the German army would get rid of Hitler and his henchmen. The 
anti-Nazi stance of many German generals, who later took part in the 
assassination plot of July 20, 1944, was known to persons who, like Heisenberg 
through the “Wednesday Society”, were close to opposition circles. For 
Heisenberg, it was part of his care for Bohr to think in sober terms of the future 
and of Bohr’s and his institute’s survival. It would be advisable to end 
opposition to a victorious Germany, Heisenberg suggested to Bohr. It would be 
better for Bohr and his institute, Heisenberg felt, to have normal relations with 
the German Legation in Copenhagen. He knew that some of its diplomats were 
non-Nazi and ready to assist Bohr in any way at their disposal. (One of these 
diplomats, Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, later informed the Danish underground 
movement of the impending arrest and deportation of Danish Jews. This led to 
                                           
6
 This account of how Heisenberg opened his conversation with Bohr and how Bohr reacted is based 
on a report by Bohr to Eugen Feinberg when Bohr visited Moscow in May 1961. Further details are 
given on the ensuing pages. 
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the rescue of the Danish Jews by their escape to Sweden. After the war 
Duckwitz was Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in 
Copenhagen.) But for Bohr who as a Danish patriot steadfastly refused to have 
anything to do with German authorities, Heisenberg’s well-meant suggestion 
sounded like an invitation to collaboration with the Germans. He even suspected 
that Heisenberg, had their conversation continued, would have tried to persuade 
him to take part in his work on a German atomic bomb  
 
It is often claimed in the literature that Heisenberg’s aborted conversation with 
Bohr in Copenhagen in 1941 was the end of their personal friendship. This is not 
true. Still in Copenhagen, before his return to Germany, Heisenberg wrote a 
letter to his wife Elisabeth the recent discovery of which caused much 
excitement. It has been published
7
 in Heisenberg’s collected letters (1937 – 
1946) to his wife. This letter shows that, two days after his famous, 
misunderstood conversation with Bohr, Heisenberg spent a harmonious evening 
with Bohr at Bohr's home. They discussed physics, Heisenberg played the piano, 
and Bohr read a story to him. Thus, Bohr's "rage" after the ill-fated discussion 
cannot have been as deep as is often assumed. Their personal friendship 
continued, as is also shown by the fact that they visited each other after the war 
with their families in their homes and spent their vacations together in Greece or 
South Italy, and that Bohr wrote an article for the Festschrift to Heisenberg’s 
sixtieth birthday in 1961. 
 
Robert Jungk’s Book  
 
Another serious trial of their friendship arose, however, as the American-  
Austrian, German-born journalist Robert Jungk published, in 1956, his bestseller 
“Heller als tausend Sonnen”8 on the construction of the atomic bomb in the 
United States and on the nuclear work in Germany during the war. He had 
interviewed many of the leading physicists in both countries. Heisenberg and 
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker had freely cooperated with him. They had told 
Jungk about the intended purpose of the failed mission to Copenhagen in 
September of 1941. Weizsäcker, with several other German scientists, had also 
attended the astrophysics conference in the German Culture Institute but had not 
been present at Heisenberg’s conversation with Bohr. But Heisenberg had 
informed Weizsäcker about that failure immediately afterwards, and Weizsäcker 
had supplemented Heisenberg’s report to Jungk. 
 
                                           
7
 Werner Heisenberg, Elisabeth Heisenberg, Meine liebe Li, Der Briefwechsel 1937 – 1946, Herausgeber Anna 
Maria Hirsch-Heisenberg, Residenz Verlag Salzburg 2011  
8
 Robert Jungk, Heller als tausend Sonnen. Das Schicksal der Atomforscher, Alfred Scherz Verlag 
Bern 1956  
 
8 
 
In his book, however, Jungk embellished the sober descriptions he had received 
from the two German physicists by interpretations created by his own 
imagination. Thus, he presented Heisenberg’s satisfaction with the technical 
difficulties of bomb construction and his lack of enthusiasm for overcoming 
these difficulties, as a secret plan to prevent, for moral reasons, the construction 
of an atomic bomb for Hitler which otherwise he could have built. Heisenberg, 
and particularly von Weizsäcker, wrote long letters to Robert Jungk in which, 
while appreciating Jungk’s extensive research and detailed accounts of the 
developments, criticized some of his generalisations and exaggerations. Cathryn 
Carson, in her article “Reflexionen zu ‘Kopenhagen’”, appended to the German 
edition of Frayn’s play “Copenhagen”, quotes from these letters9. In the Danish 
translation of his book, which appeared in 1957, Jungk published an extraction 
of Heisenberg’s letter, but only the laudatory part. He omitted the criticisms and 
also Heisenberg’s remark in his letter that he would not like to be misunderstood 
as having exerted resistance against Hitler. These omittances are particularly 
regrettable because in some quarters it was even assumed that Heisenberg had 
commissioned Jungk’s book. This did much to harm Heisenberg’s credibility. 
Heisenberg never “portrayed himself after World War II as a kind of scientific 
resistance hero who sabotaged Hitler’s efforts to build a nuclear weapon”, as 
was suggested, e.g., by James Glanz in The New York Times of February 7, 
2002 after the publication of Bohr’s unsent letters to Heisenberg (see below). On 
the contrary, Heisenberg always stressed how content he had been that nuclear 
weapons did not seem to be feasible for several years to come so that Hitler and 
his government, when this had become clear to them, made no effort to build 
them. Bohr read the book in the Danish edition and took exception to Jungk’s 
description of his 1941 meeting with Heisenberg. This is understandable 
because Jungk described as completed conversation what Heisenberg had 
intended to discuss with Bohr but had not got a chance to ventilate because of 
Bohr’s refusal to listen to Heisenberg’s involved nuclear hints. Bohr, however, 
was led to believe that Heisenberg had authorized Jungk’s description. But Bohr 
did not object in public to Jungk’s presentation. He just drafted a letter to 
Heisenberg which he never posted.  
 
Bohr’s Unsent Letter to Heisenberg 
 
When it became known that the Niels Bohr Archive in Copenhagen held a letter 
by Bohr to Heisenberg, written after the appearance of Jungk’s book but never 
                                           
9
 Carson, Cathryn. “Reflections on Copenhagen . In: Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen in debate: 
Historical essays and documents on the 1941 meeting between Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, ed. 
Matthias Dörries,  Berkeley: Office for History of Science and Technology, 2005. Published in 
German as “Reflexionen zu ‘Kopenhagen.’” In: Michael Frayn, Kopenhagen: Mit zehn 
wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Kommentaren, ed. Matthias Dörries, 3rd, rev.ed., p. 172-188. Göttingen: 
Wallstein, 2003. In initial form in 1st ed., p. 149-162. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001 
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sent, speculation concentrated on this document from which some observers 
expected the solution of all the open questions. It was to be published 50 years 
after Bohr’s death, i.e. in 2012. However, to end speculation, the Niels Bohr 
Archive, around early 2002, released 11 documents pertaining to Heisenberg’s 
visit, including the much-discussed unsent letter, preceded by an article by Aage 
Bohr, first published in 1967, on “The War Years and the Prospects Raised by 
Atomic Weapons”. The documents, with the exception of one letter written by 
Heisenberg to Bohr, are unfinished drafts written by Bohr in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, addressed to Heisenberg, but never sent. As the director of the Niels 
Bohr Archive, Finn Aaserud, points out, the documents have to be viewed with 
caution. They were written 16 years or more after the event and represent just 
drafts, not finished papers. Nevertheless, the contents of the documents are 
interesting and, depending on the pre-established views and opinions of the 
readers of today, surprising to a lesser or greater degree. Here are some of the 
general characteristics of the documents: 
 
 Bohr’s tone in addressing Heisenberg is extremely cordial and friendly. 
 Bohr was still highly interested in clarifying Heisenberg’s intentions and 
motivations behind his 1941 visit. His sentences in Document 11 c “I have 
long been meaning to write to you ...” and “I have written in such length to 
make the case as clear as I can for you and hope we can talk in greater detail 
about this when opportunity arises” are proof of this. (This is new 
information. Heisenberg was under the impression that Bohr and he, having 
differing recollections of their discussion, had come to the conclusion that it 
would be best to let rest the spirits of the past. It is a pity that the letter was 
not sent. Several opportunities for clarifying conversations were missed at 
later meetings of Bohr and Heisenberg. It seems that Bohr was afraid he 
might hurt Heisenberg’s feelings by insisting too much on his interpretation 
of the events.) 
 Document 1 contains the confirmation that Bohr and Heisenberg met several 
times during Heisenberg’s visit to Copenhagen in 1941: Bohr refers to “our 
conversations” in the plural, and he mentions “our conversation in my room 
at the institute” as well as the strong impression Heisenberg’s remarks made 
“on Margrethe and me”. Since it is unlikely that Bohr’s wife Margrethe was 
present at the confidential conversation in Bohr’s room in the institute one 
may assume that Heisenberg’s recollection is correct that he was also invited 
to Bohr’s home. This is confirmed by Heisenberg’s much later discovered 
letter to his wife written before his departure from Copenhagen in 1941. 
Moreover, there is Heisenberg’s and von Weizsäcker’s testimony that the 
critical discussion took place during a walk, to avoid unwanted earwitnesses.  
 Bohr understood and appreciated that one of Heisenberg’s reasons for the 
visit was genuine care: to see how Bohr and his institute fared under German 
occupation and to be of assistance, if at all possible (Document 11 c). Bohr 
suspected, however, that the main reason for Heisenberg’s visit was to get 
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him, Bohr, involved in Germany’s atomic bomb project which, Bohr thought 
Heisenberg had cautiously hinted, existed in reality under his, Heisenberg’s, 
leadership. When Bohr came to this conclusion he stopped the conversation. 
This is admitted by Bohr in Document 11 c where he writes “During the 
conversation, which because of my cautious attitude was only brief ...”. 
Bohr’s cautiousness was justified by his fear that any words he might speak 
would be somehow made known to German authorities. There is no 
indication of an awareness by Bohr that Heisenberg was under the same 
handicap.  In public conversations, also in the cafeteria of Bohr’s institute, he 
may have had to say things which did not represent his true opinion. (This 
situation is well-known to people having lived under cruel dictatorships.) 
 
 Document 6 says that Heisenberg “did not wish to enter into technical details 
but that Bohr should understand that he knew what he was talking about as 
he had spent 2 years working exclusively on this question.” Bohr had known 
about the possibility of nuclear weapons only in a very general way and at 
that time still had held the opinion that the technical difficulties were 
insurmountable. Bohr had been “doubtful looking” (Document11a). 
Therefore Heisenberg found it necessary to mention his two years of 
investigations in order to convince Bohr that he was not “talking 
moonshine”. Bohr interpreted this, erroneously, as meaning that Germany 
was working, with Heisenberg’s leading participation, on the production of 
atomic bombs. As mentioned above, Bohr could not imagine that Heisenberg 
would reveal a state secret of this importance to him, a foreigner, unless he 
was authorized, or even ordered, to do so. But Heisenberg’s trust in Bohr was 
of such depth that he dared to do that on his own initiative though very 
cautiously. To his dismay, Bohr did not allow him to complete his cautious 
message that the construction of an atomic bomb would take several years so 
that it would NOT be attempted in Germany for the near future. The question 
for which Heisenberg would have liked to know Bohr’s opinion was whether 
it might be possible to come to an agreement within the still relatively small 
international community of nuclear physicists not to work on the construction 
of atomic bombs at all.  This, for Heisenberg, was the central reason for his 
trip to Copenhagen in 1941 and his visit with Bohr.  
 
For Bohr, however, the all-important message was Heisenberg’s advice to 
take into account the imminent victory of Germany, anyhow the lesser evil 
compared to Soviet occupation, and stop boycotting German institutions in 
Copenhagen. For Heisenberg this had been only an introductory item of 
secondary urgency for opening  the conversation. Bohr saw under this advice 
also Heisenberg’s hidden reference to atomic bombs and interpreted it as an 
indirect, most unwelcome invitation for cooperation also in this area. For 
Heisenberg his advice to prepare for an apparently unavoidable victory of 
Germany was of secondary importance compared to the question how to deal 
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with the “open road” to atomic armaments. Therefore this aspect of his 1941 
visit to Copenhagen did not receive much attention in his reports after the 
war when this episode came up. For Heisenberg they were only of marginal 
importance so that he did not even mention them in the interview with Robert 
Jungk. 
 
 The further development of the war in 1942 and later must have removed 
Heisenberg’s conviction of 1941 that Germany will be victorious. Bohr 
wondered for many years whether this was the reason why Heisenberg, in 
retrospect, had forgotten or repressed these statements which Bohr clearly 
remembered but Heisenberg, according to Robert Jungk, did not mention. On 
the other hand, again according to Robert Jungk, Heisenberg claimed to have 
said things to Bohr which Bohr was sure not to have heard. These concerned 
Heisenberg’s questions about Bohr’s opinion regarding an international 
agreement of the community of nuclear physicists not to make atomic bombs. 
Bohr did not know that Heisenberg, in a letter to Jungk, clarified that he had 
indeed planned to ask Bohr questions of this kind but was given no chance to 
ask them because Bohr ended the conversation abruptly when the topic of 
atomic bombs was touched. Jungk had presented as established fact what 
Heisenberg had just intended to do. Thus, it was not surprising that Bohr did 
not remember what Jungk described.  
 
Feinberg’s Report on Bohr’s Reminiscences 
 
E. L. Feinberg reports in his book  Physicists. Epoch and Personalities
10
 that 
Bohr, when he visited Moscow in May 1961, 16 months before his death, 
was still pondering about the possible reason for the discrepancy between 
what he remembered about the conversation with Heisenberg in Copenhagen 
in 1941 and what Heisenberg, according to Jungk, seemed to remember. 
Bohr told Feinberg and other Russian listeners: „Heisenberg is a very honest 
man. It is astonishing, however, how one is capable of forgetting one’s 
views if he is gradually changing them“11 This appraisal of Heisenberg’s 
character by Bohr agrees with a statement by Edward Teller in his memoirs, 
also reported by Feinberg
12: “Heisenberg was not only a brilliant physicist 
but also a person whose decency and feeling of responsibility I could 
observe many times. I cannot imagine that he supported Nazis by his own 
good will, even less that he did it with enthusiasm as Bohr’s version 
                                           
10
 E. L. Feinberg, Physicists. Epoch and Personalities, World Scientific Publishing C., New Jersey 
London 2011, Sections 8.1 and 8.2 (“Tragedy of Heisenberg” and “Bohr and Heisenberg”) 
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 E. L. Feinberg, loc. cit., page 298 
12
 E. L. Feinberg, loc. cit., page 310 
12 
 
declares. How could it happen that Bohr misunderstood him? Information 
that I have gathered leads me to the thought that Heisenberg went to Bohr 
for moral advice … “ 
 
In other words: Bohr could not imagine that Heisenberg, an honest man, 
after the war deliberately distorted the truth when he reported his version of 
what was said during the famous 1941 meeting. If that differed from what 
Bohr thought he clearly remembered, the solution must be sought in 
psychology: Heisenberg’s changing views on the outcome of World War II 
since 1941 must have changed, unconsciously, his memory of what he had 
told Bohr. 
 
In reality, both were right. As Hans Bethe put it
13
: “The two famous 
physicists just talked past each other, starting from different assumptions.” 
Each of them just remembered those parts of the conversation which 
concerned what he had considered to be the most relevant topic: Bohr his 
assumed invitation by Heisenberg to be involved in his suspected atomic 
bomb project, Heisenberg his failed attempt to get Bohrs opinion on what 
the international community of nuclear physicists might do regarding the 
road leading to atomic weapons, still closed at present for practical reasons 
but clearly open in years to come. 
 
In this context ít may be of interest what Edward Teller told the present 
author (K. G.) during the lunch break at a conference in the U.S. in 1980
14
,  
when what Teller called „the tragedy“ of the misunderstanding between 
Bohr and Heisenberg during Heisenberg’s visit to Copenhagen in 1941 came 
up in the conversation. Teller said that Bohr had been shocked and dismayed 
about the Nazis, was himself in a personally endangered situation, and 
apparently did not listen carefully enough. For any other person this would 
have been excusable, Teller said, but not for Bohr who had spent his life 
teaching complementarity and the necessity to use imperfect language for 
expressing the truth. Therefore he, Teller, would assign to Bohr the main 
responsibility for that tragical misunderstanding.  
 
But also Heisenberg may have made a mistake by being too cautious. His 
friend and collaborator Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker who had 
accompanied Heisenberg to Copenhagen and had waited in their hotel for 
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 Hans A. Bethe, PHYSICS TODAY, issue of July 2000 
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the result of Heisenberg’s conversation with Bohr and learned first-hand 
from the desperate Heisenberg about the complete failure of his mission 
thought later, as quoted by Feinberg
15
 that Heisenberg approached his main 
topic much too slowly. He should have said immediately: “Dear Niels Bohr, 
I shall now tell you something which will cost my life if the wrong people 
learn about it. We study atomic weapons. It would be vital for humanity if 
we and our colleagues in the West would understand: All of us must work in 
such a way that a bomb will not be produced. – Do you think that might be 
possible?” Heisenberg talked too long in involved language and thus gave 
Bohr the chance to misunderstand and end the conversation before 
Heisenberg had completed his message. Jungk, however, in his book gave 
the impression that Heisenberg had been able to tell Bohr about the mere 
possibility of atomic weapons and that this shocked Bohr so deeply that he 
had become unable to listen any further. 
 
Heisenberg had not anticipated that Bohr would wonder who had authorized 
or ordered him to discuss with him military secrets. He had no strategy for 
dispelling suspicions of this kind. He had just assumed Bohr would 
understand that he spoke in his private capacity as Bohr’s old friend and 
colleague who, however, because of the delicacy of the subject discussed, 
had to use very involved language. This assumption was sadly disappointed. 
Heisenberg was always sad that Bohr had misunderstood the purpose of his 
1941 visit, and the unsent Bohr letters by Bohr also show that Bohr, 
unknown to Heisenberg, continued to ponder about the "mystery" why he 
and Heisenberg had so different memories of that event. (The "mystery", of 
course, was to a large extent Robert Jungk's doing.) In any case, probably 
because both of them thought that the other one preferred not to discuss the 
matter any further, they never tried to clarify their mutual misunderstanding.  
 
Later during the war repeated  German propaganda talks of the imminent use 
of “new weapons” fortified suspicions by Bohr and his Danish colleagues 
that there was a German nuclear bomb programme. Assertions to the 
contrary by Jensen, who visited Bohr a year later, were not trusted though he 
himself was considered honest. But Jensen was working on the reactor 
programme, and it had to be doubted that he was privy to all aspects of the 
programme. 
  
 After Bohr’s escape to Sweden and subsequent flight to Great Britain in the 
autumn of 1943 “it was quite clear already then, on the basis of intelligence 
reports, that there was no possibility of carrying out such a large undertaking 
in Germany before the end of the war”. (Document 11 b). This is a 
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remarkable confirmation of Heisenberg’s own conclusion. It is also 
interesting that these intelligence reports had no influence on the progress of 
the Manhattan project. 
 
 
Question 4: What did Heisenberg and von Weizsäcker mean to say at Farm Hall 
after hearing of the Hiroshima bomb? 
Six months, from July 3, 1945 to January 3, 1946, ten German nuclear physicists 
and nuclear chemists (Erich Bagge, Kurt Diebner, Walther Gerlach, Otto Hahn, 
Paul Harteck, Werner Heisenberg, Horst Korsching, Max von Laue, Carl 
Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Karl Wirtz) were interned under comfortable 
conditions at “Farm Hall”, a country mansion not far from Cambridge, used by 
the British Secret Service for the instruction of agents. Secret microphones were 
installed in their rooms, and their conversations were monitored, registered on 
coated discs and, as far as considered relevant, translated into English for the use 
of General Leslie Groves, the head of the U. S. Manhattan Project. In his  
memoirs “Now it can be told. The Story of the Manhattan Project”, published in 
1962, Groves revealed that these transcriptions existed in the archives. They 
were kept secret until 1991 when they were finally made available to historians 
and the interested public. The German originals had been deleted because the 
coated discs had been re-used after transcription. 
 
The evaluation of the published English transcriptions resulted in a lively and 
often controversial debate in public discussions and writings on how to interpret 
the comments  made by the internees, and in particular by Werner Heisenberg, 
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker and Otto  Hahn, when they received the news of 
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and thereafter. Special 
attention was given to the following symptomatic remarks. 
 
Heisenberg’s Contradictory Statements on the Order of Magnitude of the 
Critical Mass 
 
1. Heisenberg’s first reaction to the news heard at 6 p. m. on August 6 was 
that he did not believe that the atomic bomb mentioned was a true nuclear 
bomb. As justification for his disbelief he said that he could not imagine  
that the Americans had been able to procure the necessary two tons of 
uranium 235. Hans A. Bethe
16
 concludes from this remark that 
Heisenberg cannot have worked on making nuclear weapons because in 
1945 he still upheld for the critical mass of uranium 235 the old, much too 
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large value of several tons that had been discussed before the war on the 
basis of simple random walk theories. Obviously he had not been 
interested in obtaining a precise value for the all-important critical mass. 
Bethe thought, as reported by Feinberg
17
, that perhaps Heisenberg did not 
want to know. When asked about the critical mass, depending on the 
occasion, he had mentioned different values from ten kilograms to several 
tons. One example is the reply by Otto Hahn to Heisenberg’s spontaneous 
reaction on August 6: “But tell me why you used to tell me that one 
needed 50 kilograms of ‘235’ in order to do anything. Now you say one 
needs two tons.” Heisenberg gave an evasive reply. Another example is 
Heisenberg’s reply at the Harnack House meeting on June 4, 1942 to 
Field Marshal Erhard Milch who had asked how large a bomb would have 
to be that could destroy a large city like London. Heisenberg is reported to 
have answered “about the size of a pineapple” which is not far from the 
truth if only the content of U 235 is meant. An anonymous report in 
spring 1942 to German Army Ordnance estimates for the critical mass a 
value between 10 and 100 kilograms. It is assumed that this estimate is 
due to Heisenberg. Manfred von Ardenne, German physicist and inventor 
and head of a private electronic and nuclear laboratory in Berlin recalls in 
his memoirs that Heisenberg told him around 1942 that only a few 
kilograms of U 235 would suffice for starting a chain reaction. 
 
Only three hours later, at 9 p. m. on August 5, 1945, another radio 
announcement made it clear that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was a 
Uranium bomb. Nine days later, on August 14, Heisenberg gave a lecture 
to his fellow internees in which he presented a correct theory of the 
atomic bomb. It showed that he would have been able to develop the 
correct theory of nuclear weapons, had he concentrated on that subject 
earlier. 
 
Carl H. Meyer’s Analysis and Hypothesis 
 
Of particular interest in this context are the investigations by Carl H. 
Meyer and Günter Schwarz.
18
 Puzzled by the contradictory reports on 
Heisenberg’s ignorance or knowledge of the critical mass of U 235 they 
followed in detail the calculations made by Heisenberg in 1939/1940 on 
orders by Army Ordnance. After the war these calculations were 
published in Heisenberg’s collected works (edited by W. Blum, H. P. Dürr 
and H. Rechenberg). Meyer and Schwarz thoroughly analyzed them. They 
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find, as explained in their preprint (see footnote 18), that Heisenberg 
closed his calculations without giving a number for the critical mass. For 
whatever reason he did not take this last step which was within reach for 
him. This corroborates what Bethe concluded: Heisenberg did not want to 
know the correct value of the critical mass. He was interested in building 
a nuclear reactor, not nuclear weapons.  
 
There remains the question why Heisenberg, for explaining his doubt 
about the nuclear character of the Hiroshima bomb, when hearing about it 
at 6 p. m. mentioned a ton value for the critical mass rather than one of the 
much smaller estimates which he had given in 1942 to Otto Hahn, Field 
Marshal Milch, Manfred von Ardenne and Army Ordnance which, though 
smaller, had still been considered to be much too high for technical 
realization in less than several years.    
 
To this question Meyer and Schwarz offer quite a new hypothetical 
answer. Heisenberg made his outdated two-ton remark at the time 
between 6 p. m. and 9 p. m. when it was still uncertain and, for 
Heisenberg, even unlikely that the U. S. had accomplished the 
construction of a nuclear bomb. Heisenberg still held the belief that he and 
his team were further advanced in their work and their knowledge in this 
field than his American and British competitors and would be able to use 
this advanced knowledge as a “bargaining chip” in future negotiations. In 
this belief Heisenberg had been strengthened by his former close friend 
Samuel Goudsmit, in whose house Heisenberg had stayed when last 
visiting the United States in the summer of 1939. Goudsmit was now the 
scientific head of the ALSOS mission and had interrogated Heisenberg in 
Heidelberg in May 1945 after his arrest in Urfeld. When Heisenberg, 
naively but trustfully, had asked him about nuclear work in the U. S. since 
1939 Goudsmit had replied that not much had happened because during 
the war U. S. physicists had other things to do. In the presence of British 
Major Rittner and possible further earwitnesses Heisenberg did not want 
to give his bargaining chip away by showing, prematurely, his advanced 
knowledge gained in two years of relevant studies. To satisfy the chemist 
Otto Hahn with a plausible reason why it was unlikely that the Americans 
had amassed enough U 235 for making a nuclear bomb the old, outdated 
ton-value for the critical mass would do. Unexpectedly, however, Hahn 
did remember the value of 50 kilograms that Heisenberg had estimated 
three or four years ago. This is the scenario Carl H. Meyer considered 
realistic for explaining the otherwise perhaps surprising figure Heisenberg 
had spontaneously available when suddenly confronted with the radio 
news of a so-called atomic bomb dropped on a Japanese city. 
 
17 
 
Another, much less sophisticated explanation for Heisenberg’s return to 
an obsolete estimate for the critical mass would be that Heisenberg, for 
the last three years, had just worked on reactor construction, cosmic ray 
physics, elementary particle physics, philosophy and was happy not to 
have to think any longer about nuclear weapons and the critical mass. 
Anyway, its value he had never tried to calculate precisely. He had just 
roughly estimated it and by now (1945) it had escaped his memory or, at 
least, was not immediately available. The present author (K. G.) thinks 
that this simpler solution is probably the correct one though Meyer’s 
scenario cannot be ruled out. Meyer deems it impossible that Heisenberg 
ever could have forgotten the order of magnitude of a natural constant of 
such fundamental importance as the critical mass of U 235!  
 
Unfortunately, the U. S. mathematician and cryptologist Carl H. Meyer 
died just after the publication of the preprint mentioned in footnote 18 and 
in the list of Literature attached at the end. He had begun to write an 
extensive book on the life and work of Werner Heisenberg which now 
remains unfinished. 
 
Farm Hall Remarks by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker 
 
2. According to the transcriptions, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (CFvW) 
also made some spontaneous remarks upon hearing of the atom bomb  
dropped on a Japanese city by the U.S. The views or intentions that led to 
these remarks are often ascribed in the literature to Heisenberg’s team as a 
whole, in particular because CFvW is known to have been a close 
collaborator and friend of Heisenberg. In these remarks CFvW expressed 
the following views: 
 
a. Our team did not really want to make the bomb. Had we worked with 
the same devotion and intensity as the Americans we, too, could have 
succeeded. 
To the second sentence Otto Hahn replied: “I do not believe that. And 
I am very happy that we did not succeed.” 
The first sentence, however, seems to be supported also by an 
observation made in Russia during the last years of the war, as 
reported by E. L. Feinberg to CFvW in Moscow in 1987
19
: A thorough 
check of U.S. journals had shown that all the physicists in the U.S. 
who were considered capable of working on nuclear bombs had ceased 
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publishing. Apparently they were fully absorbed by secret work. 
Heisenberg, on the other hand, had published, as editor, a small 
volume on cosmic radiation which contained lectures by himself, 
CFvW, Wirtz and other members of the “Uranium Club” in a seminary 
held during the first years of the war. The conclusion was that if they 
worked on nuclear bombs at all, the work did not fully occupy them. 
 
b. History will record that the Americans and the English made a bomb, 
and that at the same time the Germans, under the Hitler regime, 
produced a workable engine. In other words, the peaceful development 
of the uranium engine was made in Germany under the Hitler regime, 
whereas the Americans and the English developed this ghastly weapon 
of war. 
This statement is sometimes quoted in the literature as proof that the 
German team congratulated itself for its “moral superiority” as 
compared to the American bomb builders. However, for CFvW it was 
just a statement of a paradoxical fact. When he made it he only knew 
that the Americans had made a Uranium bomb, and he did not know 
yet, before the Nagasaki bomb, that the Americans had also 
constructed reactors, ever since Fermi’s first critical chain reaction 
already in December 1942, and had produced plutonium by operating 
large reactors. CFvW, as well as Heisenberg, never claimed “moral 
superiority” from the fact that they had not built atomic bombs. On the 
contrary, they expressed understanding for their American colleagues 
who were “on the good side” in the battle against Hitler and could 
have a good conscience in their  – though hypothetical – race to let the 
democracies have the bomb before Hitler had it and used it for  world 
domination.  
 
Final Remarks 
 
It may be hoped that the facts and arguments presented in this paper will help 
to reveal why the simplified saying  “Heisenberg tried to build an atom bomb 
for Hitler and failed”, mentioned in the Introductory Remarks above, and in 
various modifications still findable in contemporary texts, is based on 
historical misunderstandings, is misleading and, if a brief summary is needed, 
should be replaced by something like this:  “Heisenberg, like several other 
German physicists, was drafted by German Army Ordnance when war began 
in Europe in September 1939 to investigate whether the energy from splitting 
Uranium nuclei by neutrons could be used for military purposes. Heisenberg 
found that this is possible in principle but would require such enormous 
industrial expenditures that it would take many years and would be 
impracticable while the war lasted. The project was therefore dropped by the 
Nazi Government in 1942. Heisenberg had even refrained from calculating a 
19 
 
precise value for the critical mass of U 235. He was relieved that he was thus 
spared a moral decision between obeying an order to build the bomb or 
risking his life by refusing to be involved in the project or sabotaging it. He 
was happy to be confined to a project of building a small test reactor under 
civilian administration that the Government had approved. In 1941 
Heisenberg had tried to get the opinion of Niels Bohr in Copenhagen on what 
the international community of nuclear physicists could possibly do or 
prevent regarding the long-range technical feasibility of making nuclear 
weapons.  Bohr had misunderstood Heisenberg’s cautious approach.” 
 
This article appeared, in June 2016, on the website of the Heisenberg Society, 
www.heisenberg-gesellschaft.de. In a slightly modified form and under the title 
“Werner Heisenberg – Was He a Would-Be Pioneer of the Atom Bomb? The 
Longevity of Myths About Heisenberg’s Activities During World War II” it was 
published in the July 2016 issue of the Physics and Society Newsletter of the 
American Physical Society.   
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